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The Thought Experimental Method:
Avicenna’s Flying Man Argument*
ABSTRACT: No argument from the Arabic philosophical tradition has received more
scholarly attention than Avicenna’s ‘ﬂying man’ thought experiment, in which a
human is created out of thin air and is able to grasp his existence without
grasping that he has a body. This paper offers a new interpretation of the version
of this thought experiment found at the end of the ﬁrst chapter of Avicenna’s
treatment of soul in the Healing. We argue that it needs to be understood in light
of an epistemological theory set out elsewhere by Avicenna, which allows that all
the constitutive properties of an essence will be clear to someone who
understands and considers that essence. On our reading, this theory is put to
work in the ‘ﬂying man’: because the ﬂying man would grasp that his own
essence has existence without grasping that he has a body, connection to body
cannot be constitutive of the essence.
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No argument from the Arabic philosophical tradition has received more scholarly
attention than Avicenna’s ‘ﬂying man’ thought experiment. It has recently been
hailed as a major contribution to the theory of self-awareness (Kaukua : ch.),
and in the past it has been compared to Descartes’s cogito argument. Though
Avicenna alludes to the argument several times in his works (see the list in Hasse
: –), the passage on which most scholarship has focused—and on which
we will likewise concentrate here—is to be found on the last page of the ﬁrst
chapter of Avicenna’s () treatment of soul in his Healing (al-Shifāʾ) – we will
subsequently refer to this section of the Healing as On the Soul. The Healing is
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distinguished fromAvicenna’s other systematic philosophical compendia by its length
and also by its self-conscious engagement with the Aristotelian tradition (for a
detailed analysis of this aspect of the text in the case of the Metaphysics of the
Healing see Bertolacci ). Our passage is a case in point. The ﬁrst chapter offers
a nuanced critique of previous attempts to deﬁne soul, with special reference to
Aristotle’s deﬁnition that soul is, as Avicenna phrases it, ‘the ﬁrst perfection of the
natural, organic body to which it belongs to perform the actions of life’ (On the
Soul .–; cf. Aristotle, De Anima ..b–).
The thought experiment needs to be understood in this context. It is an attempt to
do what Aristotle’s deﬁnition failed to do in Avicenna’s opinion: determine whether
it belongs to the soul’s essence that the soul be related to a body. By considering the
ﬂying man scenario, we come to see that the answer to this question is no. Thus, the
upshot of the ﬂying man thought experiment is akin to learning, for instance, that it
is no part of the essence of a triangle that triangles should have three equal sides. A
trianglemay have three equal sides, but it need not, and likewise a soulmay be related
to a body, but it need not be. Several previous scholars have already appreciated this
very speciﬁc and indeed rather narrow consequence of the ﬂying man argument (at
least as it is used in the chapter with which we are concerned), namely, that it
excludes corporeality from the soul’s essence (Druart ; Hasse ; Sorabji
:; Sebti :). Indeed, Avicenna could hardly be clearer that the
thought experiment is supposed to tell us about the essence of the soul than he is
in the opening of the famous passage, here quoted in full (On the Soul
.–.; we label the sections for ease of reference):
[A] We have now come to know the meaning of the name that applies to
the thing called ‘soul’ through a relationship that it has. So it would be
appropriate for us to occupy ourselves with grasping the essence
(māhiyya) of this thing which is said to be ‘soul’ by the consideration
[ just discussed].
[B] We ought to indicate here an afﬁrmation of the existence of soul
which is an afﬁrmation for us by way of admonition and calling to
mind (ʿalā sabıl̄ al-tanbıh̄ wa-l-tadhkır̄), as an indication that will
make a powerful impression on someone who has the capacity for
noticing the truth by himself, without needing to be instructed,
prodded, or turned away from sophistries.
[C] We say: one of us must suppose that he is created all at once, and
created as perfect, but with his sight prevented from seeing anything
external [to him]. He is created hovering in the air, or in a void, in such
a way that the air does not buffet him so that he would have to feel it.
His limbs are separated so that they do not meet or contact one another.
[D] Then, he considers whether he afﬁrms the existence of his essence
(dhāt). He has no doubt in his afﬁrmation that his essence is existent,
even while he does not afﬁrm any extremity among his limbs, nor
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anything inward among his innards—not his heart or his brain—nor
anything external. Rather, he has afﬁrmed his essence while not
afﬁrming for it any length, width, or depth. If in this situation he were
able to imagine a hand or another limb, he would not imagine it as a
part of his essence, nor as a condition for his essence.
[E] You know that what is afﬁrmed is distinct from what is not afﬁrmed,
and what is acknowledged is distinct from what is not acknowledged.
Therefore, as to the essence whose existence he afﬁrms, it is speciﬁc
(khāsṣịyya) for it that it is identical to him (anna-hā huwa bi-ʿaynihi)
and distinct from his body or his limbs, which he has not afﬁrmed.
[F] Thus the alert person has a way to be admonished concerning the
existence of the soul as something distinct from the body, or rather
distinct from body (ghayr al-jism bal ghayr jism), and [a way] by
which he may understand it and be aware of it. But if he is heedless,
he may need to be prodded.
As we will see below, there is some dispute over the meaning of the word dhāt in [D]
and [E], since dhāt can mean both ‘self’ and ‘essence’. But there can be no
disagreement about māhiyya in [A], which is unambiguously Avicenna’s word for
‘essence’.
However, the very vividness and power of the thought experiment practically
invites us to draw more dramatic and less technical conclusions, for instance, that
one cannot doubt one’s own existence (hence the comparison to Descartes) or that
the soul is self-aware (Marmura :). For Marmura this means that the
argument begs the question because it needs to proceed from the assumption that
the ﬂying man would indeed be self-aware. But in fact this is a premise of the
argument, not the conclusion, as we mention in what follows. This point has also
been made by Kaukua (:). Another problem is that the thought experiment
as it stands seems wholly inadequate for the purpose of determining which
essential properties the soul does or does not have. In this paper, however, we will
argue that the argument can do exactly what Avicenna says it should do, so long
as we make two admittedly controversial assumptions. First, that the ﬂying man
could indeed ‘afﬁrm the existence of his essence’ [D]. Though Avicenna elsewhere
insists that self-awareness is an ineliminable feature of human mental life, he
makes no attempt to argue for that here (see Black ). Rather, he seems to
proceed on the basis that the sufﬁciently insightful person invoked in [B] and [F]
will simply have a strong intuition that the ﬂying man does indeed know that his
essence exists. Second, and far less obviously, Avicenna is assuming that someone
who is in a position to ‘entertain mentally’ an essence can grasp all of the features
There is a problem with the reading of the Arabic here; we agree with the one suggested in Hasse (:):
muqarr and yuqarra.
Reading la-hā, with several manuscripts. Hasse (:) and Kaukua (:) retain Rahman’s la-hu and
take -hu to refer to the ﬂying man.
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that belong to that essence. If you can understand a triangle without considering a
triangle as equilateral, then it is no part of the essence of triangle to have three
equal sides. Likewise, so we contend, if the ﬂying man can grasp the existence of
his soul’s essence without grasping the existence of his body, then no relation to
the body belongs to that essence. Avicenna’s epistemology, especially concerning
the knowledge of essences, thus forms a vital background for grasping the
function of the ﬂying man.
. Criticisms of the Flying Man
Avicenna’s thought experiment is a bit like Anselm’s ontological argument, in that
there is general agreement that it is unconvincing, but general disagreement about
where it goes wrong. Various diagnoses of Avicenna’s mistake have been offered,
of which we will concentrate on two. Let us begin with the worry that the ﬂying
man argument involves an illegitimate form of inference. Just as Anselm has been
accused of moving from the conceptual level to the level of reality in his proof of
God, so Michael Marmura accuses Avicenna of executing ‘an unwarranted
swerve from the hypothetical to the categorical’ (Marmura :). Marmura
does not spell out what he means by this, but the thought is presumably that, in
general, we cannot draw conclusions about what is in fact the case from
counterfactual scenarios. This methodological principle is far from obvious
though. After all, some modern-day philosophers think that the purported
conceivability of (counterfactual) zombies can warrant conclusions about our
(factual) minds (the touchstone of this modern debate is Chalmers ).
To this we can add two further observations about the way Avicenna sets up the
thought experiment, which may help answer Marmura’s worry. For one thing, at
least in this version, the ﬂying man is not a hypothetical being whom we are to
consider from a ‘third-person’ point of view, like a zombie. Rather, Avicenna says
that ‘one of us (al-wāḥid min-nā)’ should imagine being in the scenario. Obviously
the situation remains counterfactual, but Avicenna may be trying to get us to
introspect about our own access to our essences and about what could and could
not impede that access. If so, then he is using a counterfactual scenario to ‘direct
attention’ to a fact about our real mental life. This could be why he labels the
argument as a tanbıh̄, meaning ‘reminder’ or ‘admonition’, in other words, a
prompt for reﬂection or suggestive argument rather than a full-blown proof.
For another thing, it is worth thinking about the sense in which the scenario is
‘hypothetical.’ Avicenna says in [C] that the ﬂying man is ‘created,’ that is, by
The alert reader may note that in section [D] Avicenna speaks of the ﬂying man afﬁrming the existence of his
own essence, not his soul’s essence. We will return to this issue below.
 See Aquinas ST I Q., a., repl. obj., regarding Anselm’s ontological argument showing only that God has
being in apprehensione intellectus and not in rerum natura.
Hasse (:) also thinks the label of tanbıh̄ can help resolveMarmura’s worry though he does not explain
why. It seems thatHasse is thinking that the ‘logical status’ of tanbıh̄ is weaker thanMarmura presupposes: he cites
Dimitri Gutas’s characterization of tanbıh̄āt as mere ‘hints and guidelines’ rather than ‘ready-made arguments’.
The thought would then seem to be that though you cannot prove something categorical on a hypothetical
basis, you can be alerted to something categorical on such a basis. We will return below to this sort of
‘bar-lowering’ response.
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God. Now, in Avicenna’s systemGod does not just immediately create human beings
ex nihilo. Rather, divine causation is mediated by a series of subdivine cosmological
principles. Thus, to say the least, it is rather unclear how God could summon the
ﬂying man into existence in the real world as Avicenna understands it. If we grant
what seems to be presupposed by the thought experiment, namely, that God does
in some sense have the power to create the ﬂying man, then we must admit that
the ﬂying man is not merely conceivable but is actually possible within the causal
structure of the real universe, in the good Avicennan sense that God could render
him existent. This, incidentally, goes for other medieval thought experiments that
invoke divine power when hypothesizing a counterfactual scenario, for instance,
God’s creating a perfect sphere touching a perfect plane at only one point. Given
divine power to do anything that is logically possible, everything conceivable
becomes really possible (assuming, that is, that logical possibility marks the
bounds of the conceivable). This is important because, as we will see later,
Avicenna thinks the real possibility of an essence is the requirement for
discovering the properties that belong to that essence. In other words, for him real
possibility is enough to warrant categorical conclusions.
Let us now turn to another critique of the thought experiment, which has been
considered by several authors, most recently by Jari Kaukua. He puts the worry
this way: Avicenna ‘seems to commit the rather blatant fallacy of proceeding from
an epistemic or phenomenological distinction to a metaphysical one’ (Kaukua
:). In other words, the thought experiment trades on moving from an
opaque to a transparent context. In [E], Avicenna says ‘you know that what is
afﬁrmed is distinct from what is not afﬁrmed’. But from within an opaque context
I can indeed afﬁrm the existence of Cicero without having to afﬁrm the existence
of Tully. It is only within a transparent context that the truth values of the two
afﬁrmations must be the same. Applying this to the present case, we might
suppose that the soul is in fact the body or some part of it. Then the ﬂying man
could certainly afﬁrm that his soul exists without afﬁrming that his body exists,
but this is only because he does not, and indeed cannot, know that his soul is in
fact his body.
This looks like a lethal objection to Avicenna’s thought experiment. Some
interpreters have however suggested that the argument can be saved by ‘lowering
the bar’ on Avicenna’s behalf. Emphasizing that this is an ‘admonition (tanbıh̄)’
and not a proper demonstration, it has been suggested that the thought
experiment is merely a kind of promissory note, offering us a ‘concrete idea’ of
what the self ‘could’ be apart from the body, namely, a self-aware immaterial
 For this idea proposed by Adam Wodeham, see Zupko (). Given Avicenna’s inﬂuence and the wide
reception of his psychology, it is worth considering the hypothesis that the ﬂying man argument itself spurred
Latin scholastics to devise such thought experiments based on God’s power to actualize any possible scenario.
Kaukua also uses the word ‘opaque’ in explaining the objection. See also Sebti (:): ‘to establish a
distinction of reason between two realities is not a sufﬁcient proof that they are really distinct’; and Black
(:): ‘This last move in the Flying Man, which is repeated in all of its versions, is of course problematic,
since it seems to contain the obviously fallacious inference pattern, “If I know x but I do not know y, then x
cannot be the same as y”’.
THE THOUGHT EXPER IMENTAL METHOD 
soul. Unfortunately, these face-saving proposals do not ﬁt the text very well. The
rule that ‘what is afﬁrmed is distinct from what is not afﬁrmed’ is stated
conﬁdently and with no caveat; if the conclusion were instead that these two
things are possibly distinct, Avicenna could and should have said so. Nor is there
a reference to a demonstration to be given later on that might show that they
really are distinct. To the contrary, while Avicenna seems to grant that the thought
experiment may not have its intended effect, this is only because it demands a high
degree of perspicacity on the part of the reader. If the ﬂying man does not persuade
you, this is because you are a ‘heedless’ sort of person who needs ‘further instruction’
or ‘prodding’. The perspicacious reader, by contrast, will understand the point being
made here about the soul’s essence.
. The Context of the Flying Man
To understand what this point should be, we need to turn back to the preceding
pages of the ﬁrst chapter. As already mentioned above, these pages consist of a
critical engagement with Aristotle’s deﬁnition of soul as the ‘perfection (kamāl)’ of
the body. By this Aristotle would mean a form that supplies the body with a range
of capacities ranging from the nutritive power to thinking (for a thorough
discussion of the meaning of ‘perfection’ in the reception of Aristotle up to
Avicenna, see Wisnovsky :–). The problem is that this does not capture
what the soul is in itself, but only gives us a grasp of the soul as extrinsically
related to something else, namely, the body:
If we come to know that soul is a perfection, then—however we explain
and elucidate ‘perfection’—wewill not thereby come to know the soul in
its essence (māhiyya) but only know it insofar as it is ‘soul,’ given that the
name ‘soul’ applies to it not insofar as it is a substance but insofar as it
governs bodies and is related to them. (On the Soul .–)
The same would apply to thinking of the soul as a ‘power (quwwa)’ for exercising
certain activities. This designation ‘does not include reference to the essence of the
soul as such, taken absolutely (dalāla ʿalā dhāt al-nafs min ḥaythu hiya nafs
mutḷaqan), but only in a certain respect’ (.–).
Avicenna has been preparing the ground for these criticisms since the beginning of
the chapter. There, he explained to us that when we use the word ‘soul (nafs)’, we are
only talking about soul insofar as it is a causal principle for certain activities. ‘This
expression,’ that is, ‘soul (nafs),’ ‘is a name for this thing not with regard to its
substance ( jawhar), but in respect of a relation (iḍāfa) it has, that is, in respect of
its being a principle for those activities’ (.–). To think of the soul like this is
to grasp it in virtue of some accident that it has (.: min jihat mā la-hu
ʿaraḍ mā), rather than grasping its essence, something Avicenna compares to
realizing that a moved thing has a mover, without knowing the essence (dhāt) of
 See Kaukua (:); andMarmura (:): ‘a thought experiment, not intended as a rigorous proof,
will awaken them to this knowledge’, that is, ‘experiential knowledge of ourselves’.
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the mover (.–). As he also says early in the chapter, ‘on the basis of this
accidental feature (al-ʿāriḍ) that belongs to it, we need to work on verifying its
essence (dhāt), in order that we may make known its quiddity (māhiyya)’ (.–).
While this may sound as if Avicenna considers Aristotle’s approach deeply
inadequate, that approach does sufﬁce to prove that the soul exists because we
know that there must be some principle that gives rise to activities in the body.
Avicenna later on adds that it is from this perspective that we deal with the soul
while doing natural philosophy, something that would otherwise be inexplicable
given that the soul is an incorporeal entity and in this respect more germane to
metaphysics (On the Soul .–; this issue has been investigated in Alpina ).
The structure of the chapter as a whole, then, is as follows. Avicenna establishes
that there exists a principle we call soul, which can be grasped accidentally through
the activities it makes manifest. This is what we do when we think of it as a power or
perfection of the body. Grasping it in this way shows us that there is indeed a
principle or entity for us to inquire about more deeply—again, think of the case of
using a moved thing to establish the existence of a previously unknown mover.
Aristotle’s deﬁnition merely does preparatory work, leaving unanswered the
deeper question: What is the essence of this thing that we are calling ‘soul’? This,
of course, is the question posed at the beginning of the ﬂying man passage, which
is worth restating here:
[A] We have now come to know the meaning of the name that applies to
the thing called ‘soul’ through a relationship (iḍāfa) that it has. So it
would be appropriate for us to occupy ourselves with grasping the
essence (māhiyya) of this thing which is said to be ‘soul’ by the
consideration (iʿtibār) [ just discussed].
That is, we need to go beyond the ‘consideration’ or ‘point of view’ from which the
soul is seen as a source of activities and ﬁnd away to grasp its essence: the task of the
ﬂying man thought experiment.
In light of this context, it seems undeniable that DagHasse is correct in saying that
the word dhāt in the ﬂying man passage means ‘essence’, and not ‘self’ (Hasse
:). To support this, Hasse refers to another use of the thought experiment
in chapter . of the On the Soul, where the ﬂying man grasps his anniyya (‘core
being’). He rightly alludes to the context here in chapter . as well. To his
persuasive argument, we would add that the word dhāt has appeared throughout
the chapter and consistently meant ‘essence’, being used interchangeably with
māhiyya. In addition to the uses of dhāt in the passages just quoted, we ﬁnd in
this chapter an explanation that being a substance requires never being in
something as in a subject, the way that an accidental property exists in a
substance. Such subject-independence must belong to the substance ‘in its essence
(dhāt)’, something that can be veriﬁed in the following way: ‘If you consider and
inquire into its essence (idhā taʾamalta dhātahu wa-naz ̣arta ilay-hā), and then no
Avicenna may here be thinking of Aristotle’s strategy of approaching God solely as a cause of motion,
something he rails against in his notes on the twelfth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Avicenna :§).
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subject is found for it at all, it is in itself substance’ (.–; for the logical
background of this argument see Benevich ).
None of this is to say that the ﬂying man argument articulates a complete,
scientiﬁc understanding of the soul. Rather, it has the limited and in fact purely
negative role of showing us that whatever the essence of soul is, it does not include
the ‘accident’ of relation to the body that formed the basis of the Aristotelian
deﬁnition of the soul as a ‘perfection of the body’. Again, Avicenna states this
fairly explicitly, when he concludes the thought experiment in [F]: ‘The alert
person has a way to be admonished concerning the existence of the soul as
something distinct from the body, or rather distinct from body (ghayr al-jism bal
ghayr jism)’. The latter contrast probably means that my soul is distinct not just
from my body, but from body in general. We should also understand this to be
the purport of his remark in [B], which labels the ﬂying man argument as a way to
‘afﬁrm the existence of the soul (ithbāt wujūd al-nafs)’. This formulation is
misleading because it makes the thought experiment sound as though it establishes
whether the soul exists at all, which has no doubt encouraged the comparisons to
Descartes’s cogito. But as we have seen, the rest of the chapter has already shown
the soul exists, on the basis that there must be some principle for the activities we
see exercised in the body. Rather, Avicenna here uses ‘existence of the soul’ as
shorthand for ‘existence of the soul as distinct from body’, as he spells it out fully
in [F]. (We are here in agreement with Alpina :.)
We are now in a position to articulate the purpose of the ﬂying man thought
experiment. It is intended to give us a very particular insight about the essence of
soul, namely, that this essence requires no connection or relation to body—a view
that might have been mistakenly inferred from Aristotle’s way of describing the
soul as the ‘perfection of the body’. To put it more positively, the ﬂying man
thought experiment helps us to see that it is essential to soul that it be
ontologically independent of body. The question now is, how can the thought
experiment do that? A clue has been given earlier in the chapter, where Avicenna
commented on the limitations of the Aristotelian approach:
We must separately devote a different investigation to the essence (dhāt)
of the soul; if we had thereby come to know the essence of the soul, then
we would have had no difﬁculty about which category it falls into. For
whoever knows and understands the essence of a thing, and then turns
his own attention (ʿaraḍa ʿalā nafsihi) to the nature of some essential
feature (tạbı ̄ʿat amr dhātı)̄ that belongs to [that thing], has no difﬁculty
concerning the existence of [that feature] for [that thing], as we have
explained in the logic. (.–)
An attentive reader of theOn the Soul .may notice that at .–, Avicenna already provides an argument
that ‘the essence of soul is not a body’. However, this does not contradict our interpretation that the ﬂying man
serves to establish the incorporeality of soul. For the argument at .– is intended to show that soul is not
just a body, which leaves open the possibility that soul still has some essential relation to body, as the
Aristotelian deﬁnition would suppose. One may compare the difference between these two arguments to the
difference between Plotinus’s arguments against Stoic materialist psychology, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s
on the other hand (Enneads IV.. and IV.. respectively).
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This passage is crucial for understanding the ﬂying man argument and evokes
Avicenna’s conﬁdence that someone who grasps a given essence will be able to
discern the features of that essence. For instance, someone who grasps what a
triangle is will be able to discern that triangles always have three sides, or that
they are a species of geometrical ﬁgure. This is much like the formulation used for
the subject-independence of substance, where we were told to ‘consider and
inquire into its essence’. To understand this fully, we need to do as Avicenna
suggests and look back to his explanation ‘in the logic’.
. Grasping Essences
Wehave just argued that the crucial distinction for the argument inOn the Soul . is
that between essential and accidental attributes. Aristotle has offered a useful
account of soul, but one limited to grasping soul through its accidental relation to
body, and the ﬂying man argument seeks to improve on this by giving us an
insight into the soul’s essence. In his logical works, Avicenna offers various ways
of understanding the difference between essential and accidental features, but the
one that is relevant for us is the deﬁnition of essentiality and accidentality
presented in his Introduction to his logical works (Avicenna , referred to in
what follows as Introduction). This part corresponds to Porphyry’s famous
Isagoge, which prefaced the Peripatetic logical corpus in the curriculum of study
of late antiquity and the Middle Ages. Here, right at the beginning of his analysis,
Avicenna states that everything in this world has an essence (dhāt) or a quiddity
(māhiyya) through which it is what it is (Introduction .). Some attributes
belong to this essence; others are accidental.
Essential attributes are features whose composition is the necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the establishment of an essence. For instance, human is deﬁned as
rational animal, and thus both animality and rationality constitute the deﬁnition
of human and are essential for him. These attributes are in this sense intrinsic to
human. The constituents of these attributes will also constitute the essence. Given
that animal is deﬁned as ‘a corporeal substance that possesses sense perception
and moves by will’, the attributes mentioned in this deﬁnition will also be among
the essential attributes of human. The same applies to the deﬁnition of each of
these attributes, such as corporeal substance, until one exhausts all attributes.
‘When they are joined together, one essence comes to be from their composition,
which is the essence of human’ (.–).
By contrast, accidental attributes are neither sufﬁcient nor necessary for the
formation of the essence to which they pertain. These accidental attributes might
be speciﬁc and even extrinsically necessary, but they are not essential (.–
.). To use the classic example, it is a necessary consequence of being a human
that one is able to laugh, but being able to laugh is not part of what it means to
be a human. To be a human is to have the relevant constitutive properties, such as
animality and rationality. Avicenna thus offers a conditional test for the difference
between the essential and the accidental: if Y is required for the constitution of X,
Y is essential for X (here and in what follows Y will stand for a predicate of X,
not for a separate cause, which might be necessary for its effect in a different
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sense). Everything else, even if it necessarily pertains toX, is extrinsic and accidental
for it. Avicenna sums up the position as follows: ‘a “thing” has a real essence (dhātan
ḥaqıq̄iyyatan), and attributes pertain to it. The reality of [that] thing is composed out
of some of them, whereas others are accidents that are not necessary for its existence,
while still others are accidents that are necessary for it’ (.–).
Avicenna furthermore considers that two sorts of existence may attach to essence,
‘mental’ and ‘concrete’. The latter is commonsense extramental existence, as when
the essence of human is instantiated in Socrates. The other is an essence that is
grasped by us so as to exist in the mind as a universal concept. Crucially, in both
cases the essence may be qualitatively one and the same: the essence of human
instantiated in Socrates fully corresponds to the idea of human we think about.
(This is the normal situation: in the case of ﬁctional or noninstantiated entities,
the essence has only mental existence.) As Jon McGinnis has rightly suggested, the
idea of the ‘human qua human’ and the strict correspondence between mental
forms and extramental entities provides Avicenna with a strong epistemological
basis for claiming that we can and do have knowledge about essences outside our
minds (McGinnis a:).
Let us now combine the two points just discussed: Avicenna’s compositional
theory of essences and his account of mental existence. The outcome is that
essences, as they are constituted by the aggregate of their intrinsic attributes in
extramental reality, can be conceptually grasped by our minds only once the same
aggregate is present to us. That is, if animal, rational, corporeal substance, and the
rest compose the essence of human in Socrates outside the mind, then these
attributes must all be contained in the essence that is in the mind too. Avicenna
draws this conclusion explicitly in his Introduction .:
If a quiddity has constituents that precede it insofar as it is that quiddity,
then the quiddity does not occur (taḥsụlu) without their preceding it, and
when a quiddity fails to occur, it occurs neither as an object of the mind
(maʿqūl) nor as a concrete object (ʿayn). Therefore, when [the quiddity]
arises as an object of the mind, it occurs only so long as that which
constitutes it occurs in the mind together with it, in the same way as it
constitutes it. Hence, if this occurs in the mind, it cannot be negated.
So these constitutive attributes must be grasped mentally together with
the conception (tasạwwur) of the thing, so that their existing for it
cannot be unknown (lā yujhalu wujūduhā la-hu) and it is impossible
to negate them of it, as if the quiddity could be established in thought
(dhihn) even as [these attributes] are actually eliminated from it. By
their ‘occurring in the intellect’, I do not mean that they are actually
brought to mind (bāl), since many objects of the mind fail to come to
attention. Rather, I mean that when one does bring [a quiddity] to
attention and at the same time brings to attention what constitutes it,
so that both are brought to mind in actuality (mukhtạr bi-l-bāl
bi-l-ﬁʿl), then [the constituting attributes] cannot be negated of it, as
though you could ﬁnd the quiddity to be actually stripped of these
[attributes] while it is conceived, I mean, when the quiddity is
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conceived in thought. If this is so, the attributes which we called
‘essential (dhātı)̄’ for mentally grasped concepts (li-l-maʿānı ̄
al-maʿqūla), must necessarily be grasped for the thing in this way,
since the quiddity cannot be conceived of in thought, unless their
conception precedes it. (.–.)
In this passage, Avicenna adopts a biconditional criterion for essential attributes:
Y is essential forX if andonly ifX cannot be graspedwithout graspingY.
Or to put the same point negatively: If X can be conceptualized without Y, then Y is
an accidental feature of X. This may seem counterintuitive. Certainly, I do not seem
to think actively about animal whenever I deploy my grasp of the essence of human.
Avicenna anticipates this objection. He clariﬁes that he does not mean explicit
apprehension of both concepts together. Rather, his idea is that if one does grasp
human, then as soon as one explicitly reﬂects on (‘brings actively to attention’)
animal and human simultaneously and asks oneself how these two concepts
relate, one will see that animal cannot be negated of human.
It will be important for our discussion of the ﬂying man thought experiment that
Avicenna phrases his criterion in terms of existence conditions. Thus, he says in the
passage just cited that the essence does not ‘occur’without the constituents occurring
and also that someonewho is conceptualizing an essence cannot fail to know that the
constituents ‘exist’ for it. As Avicenna says:
If both things are brought to your attention altogether, you cannot
negate that which is a constituent from that which is constituted by it,
in such a way that the constituted could exist in its quiddity in the
mind while that which constitutes it would not exist [in the mind].
(Introduction .–)
To use the same example as above, we can say that since animal is a constituent of
human, nothing can exist as a human without existing as an animal. More
generally, we can state a second biconditional rule:
Y is essential for X if and only if X’s existence presupposes Y’s
existence.
Notice that the biconditional would not hold if we said ‘Y is necessary forX’ instead of ‘Y is essential for X’
because one may fail to grasp necessary accidents, called ‘concomitants (lawāzim)’, while grasping an essence. For
instance, a conceptualization of human will not immediately reveal that humans are all able to laugh. Often great
effort may be needed to discover necessary accidents: consider a mathematical case like the Pythagorean theorem,
which necessarily applies to right triangles but is not part of the relevant essence and is thus not immediately evident
upon conceptualization of right triangle.
Again, this is not true for necessary accidents, or ‘concomitants’ (cf. the previous note). They depend on and
presuppose the essence, much as the essence presupposes the essential properties. Thus, for instance, human is a
precondition for being capable of laughing, not vice versa, just as rationality is a precondition for human, not
vice versa.
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Again, we should not interpret this rule as if it applied only to concrete, extramental
things. As Avicenna explicitly says, he is talking about essences insofar as they arise
either concretelyor in themind. Thus, we can reformulate the rule just given as follows:
Y is essential for X if and only if X’s mental existence presupposes Y’s
mental existence or X’s concrete existence presupposes Y’s concrete
existence.
We will henceforth call this sort of reﬂection on attributes Avicenna’s ‘conceptual
test’: in order to grasp an essence we must have grasped all its essential attributes
so that we will have no doubt as to whether this or that attribute belongs to it
essentially or accidentally. Thus, the fact that human can be grasped without
having grasped pale or capable of laughter shows that the latter properties are not
essential to human.
One might argue that this ‘conceptual test’ is a deeply problematic procedure.
How could I ever be sure that I have formed the concept of human that fully
corresponds to the extramental instantiations of the essence human? I might
worry that rationality is not really essential for human and that it only seems to be
ineliminable because I have formed the wrong concept, or I might unwittingly
have failed to grasp some of the constituent attributes so that my grasp of human
is still incomplete. These questions raise serious problems for Avicenna’s theory,
as they would for many realist epistemologies. We cannot address them here and
will simply mention that Avicenna has a developed theory of concept formation
involving both abstraction from particulars and some sort of assistance from a
cosmological intellectual principle, which could help him solve these issues (on
concept formation in Avicenna, see Hasse  and , McGinnis b,
D’Ancona ).
Avicenna’s ‘conceptual test’ ﬁnds several applications throughout his
philosophical works. For instance, it is important in proving the central idea of his
metaphysics: the essence-existence distinction. He argues that we can conceive of
the essence of human or triangle without knowing whether they exist, which
means that existence is accidental to them (Avicenna :.–). Another
example would be Avicenna’s proof that ﬁnitude is not essential for bodies, again,
because we can conceive of corporeality without presupposing ﬁnitude (Avicenna
:.–). And as we will now show, the ﬂying man argument is in fact
a further application of the conceptual test.
. Back to the Flying Man
Avicenna makes use of his conceptual test twice in On the Soul ., indeed in
passages we have already cited above. In the ﬁrst case, it supports his rejection of
 Elsewhere, Avicenna similarly proves that motion is not essential for bodies. Taneli Kukkonen noted this
example in his analysis of thought experiments (Kukkonen :). The thought experiments Kukkonen
discusses in his paper are in fact conceptual tests of essentiality and should be read in light of the epistemology
we have outlined in this paper.
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the Aristotelian deﬁnition of soul as ‘the perfection of body’. As we saw, he says in
that context that ‘whoever knows and understands the essence of a thing, and then
turns his own attention (ʿaraḍa ʿalā nafsihi) to the nature of some essential feature
(tạbı ̄ʿat amr dhātı)̄ that belongs to [that thing], has no difﬁculty concerning the
existence of [that feature] for [that thing]’. His point in the passage is to show that
Aristotle’s deﬁnition is not up to the challenge of determining that the soul is a
substance, a conclusion that will ultimately be established only in On the Soul .
(cf. Hasse :). The argument can thus be analyzed as follows:
. An essential deﬁnition provides knowledge of all essential attributes of
an essence.
. Belonging to a category is an essential attribute of essence.
. Deﬁning soul as the ‘perfection of the body’ does not provide us with
knowledge as to which category the soul belongs to.
Conclusion: ‘Perfection of the body’ is not an essential deﬁnition of the
soul.
Avicenna borrows his ﬁrst two premises from his works on logic, as he explicitly
acknowledges. Premise  is precisely the epistemological rule we observed in the
previous section: knowing an essence presupposes knowing all its essential
attributes. Premise  comes from his Categories in which Avicenna argues that
being a substance is an essential feature of substances (see Benevich ). To this
Avicenna only needs to add premise , which follows from his previous discussion
on the Aristotelian deﬁnition of soul, to reach the desired conclusion that
Aristotle’s deﬁnition fails to reveal soul’s essence. Again, this is not to say that
soul is not the perfection of the body. Rather, calling soul the perfection of the
body merely picks out its relation to bodies, something afﬁrmed and studied in
natural philosophy.
Having argued against the Aristotelian deﬁnition of soul, Avicenna frees himself
from one deﬁnition of soul that explicitly binds soul to body. Yet, he has not ruled
out the general idea that the soul may be somehow essentially related to the body.
This is the purpose of the ﬂying man argument, which deploys the conceptual test
a second time. After announcing in section [A] that the argument will tell us
something about the soul’s essence (māhiyya), he proceeds to give us a thought
experiment showing that someone can grasp the soul without even having the
concept of a body. This shows that no corporeal ideas can be involved in the
essence of soul; to put it another way, the deﬁnition of soul would not even need
to mention the body. Or to put it yet another way, in terms of the criterion given
above:
Y is essential forX if and only ifX cannot be graspedwithout graspingY.
We can substitute ‘a connection to body’ for Y and ‘soul’ for X:
A connection to body is essential for soul if and only if soul cannot be
grasped without grasping a connection to body.
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But grasping the soul without such a connection is precisely what the ﬂying man in
the thought experiment does. We may conclude that although a human soul, such as
the ﬂying man’s, does indeed have a connection to the body, this connection is
accidental.
Let us now return to the objections that have been raised against Avicenna’s
thought experiment. First, the purported shift from a transparent to an opaque
context. We already mentioned some possible responses above, but the best
answer to the objection should now be clear. If we interpret the ﬂying man
argument against the background of Avicenna’s epistemology, in particular his
conceptual test for essentiality, the argument is perfectly valid. As we can judge
that capacity to laugh is a mere accident of human because we can conceive of
human without ascribing capacity to laugh to this essence, we can also judge that
a connection to body does not feature in the essence of soul because we can
conceive of soul without a connection to body. In response, one might argue that
our interpretation of the ﬂying man just shifts the problem. In fact, it turns out
that Avicenna’s whole epistemology fails to distinguish between the opaque and
the transparent. This is, in effect, the worry we already mentioned above: how can
we judge the constituents of the mind-independent essence of human just relying
on an analysis of the mind-dependent concept of human? Yet, we have also seen
that Avicenna has an answer to this worry. Human as existing in the mind must
fully correspond to the extramental essence of human in Socrates due to the fact
that both are instances of one and the same quiddity or essence, which in itself is
neither universal nor particular, neither mental nor concretely instantiated. Thus,
Avicenna does not so much overlook the distinction between the opaque and the
transparent as give us grounds for rejecting it, at least in the context of grasping
essences. To be trapped in an opaque context, unable to conceptualize an essence
in a way that corresponds to the essence’s concrete instantiation, would for him
mean failing to grasp the essence at all. The upshot is that pressing this objection
against Avicenna’s ﬂying man argument would require critiquing his essentialist
metaphysics and epistemology as a whole.
Another objection we considered above was that the thought experiment illicitly
shifts from a hypothetical situation to a categorical conclusion. We noted above that
for Avicenna, considering a merely possible scenario can warrant such conclusions,
and now we are in a better position to see why. For Avicenna, if an attribute Y is
essential to some X, then mental inspection will show that Y cannot fail to belong
to X under any circumstances. Conversely, we need only ﬁnd one (possible)
circumstance in which X lacks Y to secure the conclusion that Y is not essential to
X. In contemporary parlance, we might say that if Y is essential to X, then there is
 It should be noted that the conceptual test envisioned in Avicenna’s Introduction only lets us know whether
Y is a constituent ofX or not. It does not tell us whetherY is necessarily connected toX as an accident, as having the
sum of internal angles equal to two right angles is a per se accident of triangle. To establish what is and is not a per
se accident, one should look for a middle term, which will not necessarily be obvious upon mental inspection of the
essence. Hence, the ﬂying man argument (on our reading at least) does not rule out that a connection to body is a
necessary accident of soul, only that such a connection is part of the soul’s essence and hence its deﬁnition.
Avicenna offers the additional proof in On the Soul . and ., where he uses the capacity to conceive of
universals as a middle term. On this argument see Adamson ().
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no possible world in whichX exists without Y. Of course, Avicenna does not operate
with the notion of possible worlds, but he does operate with the notion of mental
existence. Where we would speak of a ‘counterfactual thought experiment’,
Avicenna would speak of something that has only mental existence; indeed, we
might say that a thought experiment gives us access to something that is factual,
since being in the mind is a way of existing. But as we have seen, the conceptual
test of essentiality applies to mentally existent things just as well as to concretely
existent things, because the essence as such is the same whether a thing exists in
the mind or in the world. Recall our third formulation of Avicenna’s biconditional
criterion for essentiality:
Y is essential for X if and only if X’s mental existence presupposes Y’s
mental existence or X’s concrete existence presupposes Y’s concrete
existence.
A person in the situation of the ﬂying man has his or her soul as an object of mental
grasping (it is maʿqūl) and thus as mentally existent while his or her body is not
mentally existent. This shows that the body is not essential to the soul. It is in this
way that we can learn about the essential properties of soul from the
‘hypothetical’ ﬂying man thought experiment.
. The Role of Self-awareness
Though our reading of the thought experiment shows the two earlier objections to be
unfounded, it may seem to open Avicenna to a new objection: How can we be so
conﬁdent of discerning which properties the soul does and does not have
essentially? We are still only in the opening chapter of the psychological section of
the Healing and as yet have no proper deﬁnition of the soul to work with (for
instance, as mentioned above, it has not yet been established that the soul is a
substance). Admittedly, the ﬂying man argument does not establish any positive
attribute as being essential to the soul, but only rules out a candidate attribute,
namely, connection to the body. On our reading, though, we are able to rule out
this attribute only because we have a ‘conceptualization’ of the soul in a situation
where the body is not being ‘conceptualized’. Why suppose that the ﬂying man is
able to conceptualize his soul?
It is here that it becomes relevant to invoke the phenomenon most readers take to
be central to the thought experiment: self-awareness. As Avicenna says elsewhere, we
are constantly aware of ourselves, even when asleep (see, e.g., Kaukua [:]).
His idea then seems to be that self-awareness gives us sufﬁcient access to the soul
and its existence conditions that we are able to perform the conceptual test
involved in the ﬂying man. Note that on our interpretation, the ﬂying man
thought experiment is not primarily about the ‘self’. As we argued above, dhāt in
section [D] of the thought experiment should be translated as ‘essence’, and the
framing of the whole passage, in sections [A] and [F], shows that Avicenna is
offering us an argument that concerns the soul. Self-awareness comes into the
picture only because it is our capacity for such awareness that guarantees the
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soul’s conceptualization. It should be noted however that readers not convinced of
our translation could still accept the rest of our interpretation. If dhāt in [D]
means ‘self’ and not ‘essence’, then Avicenna simply invokes the phenomenon of
self-awareness to show us a way to bring out conceptualization of the essence of
soul to full attention. Still, we do prefer to understand dhāt as ‘essence’ because it
makes clearer how the thought experiment could do what Avicenna promises in
[A], by giving insight into a quiddity (māhiyya).
One may worry here that there is a slip from saying that the ﬂying man is aware of
his own ‘essence’ in [D] to claiming that the ﬂyingman is aware of, or conceptualizes,
the essence of his soul. To which we would reply that this is a distinction without a
difference: the ﬂying man just is his soul. This must be the case, since otherwise the
connection of his incorporeal soul or self to the body could not be accidental and his
personal identity would not continue after the death of his body. Avicenna may be
making this point explicitly in the rather inscrutable comment found in [E], which
says that ‘the essence whose existence he afﬁrms’—that is, on our reading, the
essence of ‘this thing which is said to be “soul”’ (see [A])— ‘is identical to him’.
As is clear from the idea that we are self-aware even in sleep, self-awareness is not
always, or even usually, something to which we actively attend. Therefore, the
immediate conceptualization of the soul that self-awareness makes possible will
usually remain tacit. It is perhaps for this reason that Avicenna refers to the
argument not as a ‘demonstration (burhān)’ but as an ‘admonition (tanbıh̄)’.
Avicenna is trying to draw our attention to something we already know, if only
tacitly, namely, that we are always aware of our soul in a way that does not
involve being aware of the body. If we cast our mind back to the passage from his
Introduction, we will recall that he there admits that the connection between
constituent attributes and a quiddity may not ‘actively come to mind (khatạra
bi-l-bāl bi-l-ﬁʿl)’ even though that connection is tacitly something we know. The
purpose of the ﬂying man thought experiment, then, is to ‘remind’ us that we
already have a conceptualization of our own souls, which is enough to give us
access to the existence conditions of soul—in this case, that a connection to body
is not an existence condition. This is also why Avicenna remarks in [B] and [F]
that the reader will need to be sufﬁciently perspicacious to beneﬁt from the ﬂying
man argument: Avicenna can help by offering a vivid thought experiment, but the
rest is up to us.
Note that this is not a case of ‘lowering the bar’, with the argument being a ‘mere’
admonition or reminder as opposed to a demonstration. To the contrary, if Avicenna
thinks that we have immediate access to our souls, then the resulting
conceptualization has, if anything, a stronger epistemic status than a
demonstration. For Avicenna demonstrations primarily derive necessary accidental
properties from an essence, for example, by showing that the ability to laugh is
implied by the essence of human or that the essence of triangle entails that a
triangle’s internal angles are equal to two right angles. The ﬂying man argument is
not like that. It does not establish an extrinsic necessary property. Rather, it
invokes our intimate grasp of our own souls to show us something about the
soul’s intrinsic essential features, namely, that these features do not include a need
for the body.
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. Conclusion
Webegan this paper by noting that some interpreters have seen a parallel between the
ﬂying man and Descartes’s cogito. We close by noting that on our interpretation,
there is actually a closer similarity between Avicenna’s thought experiment and a
different passage found in Descartes. In the sixth Meditation, Descartes argues
that ‘the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from
another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they
are capable of being separated, at least by God’. From this he concludes: ‘Thus,
simply by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that absolutely nothing
else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing, I can infer
correctly that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. . . .
Accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist
without it’ (Descartes :; this parallel has already been noted by Druart
: –). Here, Descartes infers from the conceivability of himself as a
‘thinking thing’ without body that he is distinct from his body; he even puts the
point in terms of existence conditions. Thus, he deploys something very like
Avicenna’s conceptual test for the essentiality of attributes. Both ask whether
body is essential for soul and deny it, given that one can conceive of body without
soul. This is not to deny that there are differences between the two thinkers. For
Descartes the test’s validity rests upon the claim that God could separate two
things without destroying them even if they are always found together. For
Avicenna, it rests upon a deep conﬁdence in the power of the human mind to see
what is, and is not, essential.
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